> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.ostering.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Scanners and Gates (SG) - URL: /taxonomies/software-factory/scanners-and-gates/ - Published: 2026-10-31T13:00:00.000Z - Updated: 2026-10-29T13:01:17.575Z - Description: Scanners and Gates (SG): 13 threats, software factory taxonomy. SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, container, licence and DAST scanners; quality gates; policy checks. - Author: Brett Crawley [Taxonomies](/taxonomies/) › [Software factory](/taxonomies/software-factory/) › Scanners and Gates **Station 08 of 17 · Line 1, Source to Artifact · 13 threats · prefix SG** A scanner is privileged code that reads everything and decides what ships, so it is both a control and a target. These cards cover SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, container, licence and DAST scanners, AI reviewers, and the gates that act on their results. **Scope:** SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, container, licence and DAST scanners; quality gates; policy checks. ![Table: Scanners and Gates (SG), 13 threats with their mitigation principles and design measures. The full text is in the PDF and Excel downloads on the software factory taxonomy overview page.](https://www.ostering.com/media/posts/111/taxonomy-table-08-SG.png =1400x4579) *Text version: every entry on this page is in the [PDF and Excel downloads](/taxonomies/software-factory/) on the overview page, where it can be searched and copied.* ## The threats - **SG·A** Weaponised Scanner - **SG·K** Fail-Open Gate - **SG·Q** Gate Override - **SG·J** Suppression Abuse - **SG·10** Policy Tampering - **SG·9** Scanned Is Not Shipped - **SG·8** Scanner Evasion - **SG·7** Reviewer Prompt Injection - **SG·6** Hostile Input to the Scanner - **SG·5** Stale Advisory Data - **SG·4** Coverage Gap - **SG·3** Findings Leakage - **SG·2** Alert Fatigue ## Where this station touches others - **Scanners and Gates and Firewall and Quarantine:** scanners judge what the factory makes; the firewall judges what comes in from outside. Both stations treat the control itself as a component that can fail or be attacked. ## Seen in the wild - **SG·A Weaponised Scanner:** Trivy and KICS GitHub Actions (2026). Sources for each case are listed on the [overview page](/taxonomies/software-factory/). ## STRIDE, CAPEC and CWE Of the 13 entries here, STRIDE fits 9 cleanly and 4 only loosely. CAPEC 3.9 has a pattern that describes 1 of them directly, only a generic parent pattern for 10, and nothing for 2. CWE 4.20 names the weakness directly for 6, has only a broader weakness for 6, and nothing for 1. The table below gives the mapping entry by entry, with the names of the CAPEC patterns and CWE weaknesses; what the mapping shows across the whole taxonomy is in [Mapping the Software Factory Threat Taxonomy to STRIDE, CAPEC and CWE](/mapping-the-software-factory-threat-taxonomy/). The Excel, SKOS and STIX downloads carry the same mapping as text. ![Table: STRIDE, CAPEC and CWE mapping for Scanners and Gates (SG), 13 threats, with each entry's STRIDE categories and fit, CAPEC 3.9 patterns and CWE 4.20 weaknesses. The full mapping is in the Excel, SKOS and STIX downloads on the software factory taxonomy overview page.](https://www.ostering.com/media/posts/111/software-factory-mapping-table-08-SG.png =1400x2119) --- ← [Dependency Resolution (DR)](/taxonomies/software-factory/dependency-resolution/) · [Software factory overview](/taxonomies/software-factory/) · [Provenance and Attestation (PV)](/taxonomies/software-factory/provenance-and-attestation/) → *© 2026 Jonathan Brett Crawley. Licensed under [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) with additional permissions: see the licence on the [software factory overview](/taxonomies/software-factory/).*