> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.ostering.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Authentication protocols (AU) - URL: /taxonomies/email-infrastructure/authentication-protocols/ - Published: 2026-10-31T13:00:00.000Z - Updated: 2026-10-29T14:52:37.838Z - Description: Authentication protocols (AU): 13 threats in the email infrastructure threat taxonomy. SPF, DKIM, DMARC and ARC as trust signals that can be weaponised. - Author: Brett Crawley [Taxonomies](/taxonomies/) › [Email infrastructure](/taxonomies/email-infrastructure/) › Authentication protocols **Layer 02 of 09 · 13 threats · prefix AU** SPF, DKIM, DMARC and ARC prove which domain handled a message, and the danger is that a pass is read as more than it means. These entries treat the protocols as trust signals that can be weaponised, in both the signing and the verifying role. **Scope:** SPF, DKIM, DMARC and ARC as trust signals that can be weaponised. ![Table: Authentication protocols (AU), 13 threats with their mitigation principles and design measures. The full text is in the PDF and Excel downloads on the email infrastructure taxonomy overview page.](https://www.ostering.com/media/posts/95/email-taxonomy-table-02-AU.png =1400x4502) *Text version: every entry on this page is in the [PDF and Excel downloads](/taxonomies/email-infrastructure/) on the overview page, where it can be searched and copied.* ## The threats - **AU·A** Pass as Endorsement - **AU·K** Cross-Tenant Identity - **AU·Q** DKIM Replay - **AU·J** Partial Signature Coverage - **AU·10** Alignment Confusion - **AU·9** Identifier Handoff - **AU·8** Laundered Trust - **AU·7** Weak or Shared Keys - **AU·6** Error as Pass - **AU·5** Policy Override - **AU·4** Signing Oracle - **AU·3** Signal Stripping - **AU·2** Report Channel Abuse ## Where this layer touches others - **Authentication and DNS:** DNS covers who can control or falsify an answer. Authentication covers what a genuine answer can be made to mean. - **Tenancy:** Tenant Confusion (DP·7), Cross-Tenant Identity (AU·K) and Shared Reputation Poisoning (SM·8) each cover a different face of shared infrastructure (configuration, identity, reputation). Shared Infrastructure, Shared Fate (T2) is the structural hazard behind all three. ## STRIDE, CAPEC and CWE Of the 13 entries here, STRIDE fits 10 cleanly and 3 only loosely. CAPEC 3.9 has a pattern that describes 2 of them directly, only a generic parent pattern for 8, and nothing for 3. CWE 4.20 names the weakness directly for 7, has only a broader weakness for 6,. The table below gives the mapping entry by entry, with the names of the CAPEC patterns and CWE weaknesses; what the mapping shows across the whole taxonomy is in [Mapping the Email Threat Taxonomy to STRIDE, CAPEC and CWE](/email-threat-taxonomy-mapping). The Excel, SKOS and STIX downloads carry the same mapping as text. ![Table: STRIDE, CAPEC and CWE mapping for Authentication protocols (AU), 13 threats, with each entry's STRIDE categories and fit, CAPEC 3.9 patterns and CWE 4.20 weaknesses. The full mapping is in the Excel, SKOS and STIX downloads on the email infrastructure taxonomy overview page.](https://www.ostering.com/media/posts/95/email-mapping-table-02-AU.png =1400x2196) --- ← [Delivery pipeline (DP)](/taxonomies/email-infrastructure/delivery-pipeline/) · [Email infrastructure overview](/taxonomies/email-infrastructure/) · [Client protocols (CP)](/taxonomies/email-infrastructure/client-protocols/) → *© 2026 Jonathan Brett Crawley. Licensed under [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) with additional permissions: see the licence on the [email infrastructure overview](/taxonomies/email-infrastructure/).*